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GOVERNMENT MESSAGES AND GOVERNMENT MONEY:
SANTA FE, MITCHELL V. HELMS, AND THE ARC OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

IRA C. LUPU*
As dramatically evidenced in the year 2000, the Supreme Court
is engaged in a profound reshaping of the ground on which issues
of religious establishment are fought. To put the matter simply, the
emerging trend is away from concern over government transfers of
wealth to religious institutions, and toward interdiction of
religiously partisan government speech.
Begin with the question of religious messages. Prior to 1980, the
Court's only decisions concerning the constitutionality of
government-sponsored religious speech involved cases in which
citizens were required by law or custom to participate actively. In
the early 1960s, the Court decided a highly controversial series of
cases involving prayer and Bible-reading in public schools.1 Some
years earlier, the Court decided a pair of cases involving
cooperation between religious entities and public officials in the
2
provision of religious instruction to students in the public schools.
All of those pre-1980 cases, however, involved legal and practical
coercion of schoolchildren to participate in religious practices. It
was not until the early 1980s' that the Supreme Court entertained
* Louis Harkey, Mayo Research Professor ofLaw, George Washington University Law
School. My thanks to Dave Douglas and others at William & Mary Law School for the
invitation to participate in an excellent conversation at the Symposium at William & Mary
in March 2000, and to Paula Zimmerman and J. Elizabeth Clarke for help with the research
for this piece.

1. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
2. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding program of"released time" for

public school students to go off-site forreligious instruction during the school day); McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating a program of religious instruction by
sectarian school instructors on public school premises during school hours).
3. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding publicly supported display of
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a case of government religious speech unaccompanied by such
coercion.
By contrast, beginning with Everson v. Board of Education4 in
1947, the case reports are thick with decisions about the
permissibility of the transfer of material government resources to
benefit religious causes and institutions. The issue of aid to
sectarian schools dominates this line of cases, but more recent
controversies have involved the provision of in-kind benefits, such
as space in public buildings5 and the reimbursement of printing
costs,' to groups and organizations with a religious mission.
Most contemporary Establishment Clause controversies are
about government support for religion through money or messages.
Indeed, in the 1999-2000 term of the Supreme Court, the two
Religion Clause decisions reflected these themes rather perfectly.
In Mitchell v. Helms,7 a splintered majority of the Court upheld a
program that provided federal and state government assistance to
elementary and secondary schools,' and in Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe,9 the Court issued a sweeping opinion
condemning a school policy that authorized student-led prayer over
the public address system at public high school football games."0
Santa Fe effectively outlawed any official prodding in the direction
of student-led prayer at school functions; Mitchell, despite the
Christmas crbche); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding chaplain's prayer at
beginning of state legislative session); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam)
(holding that state may not post Ten Commandments in public schools). McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), which upheld a Sunday Closing Law against an
Establishment Clause attack, did involve arguments that the state symbolically had
endorsed Sunday Sabbath, but it also involved coercion. Lynch is the first case in which the
Establishment Clause claim involved a message unaccompanied by any form of coercion.
4. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
5. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(holding school district violated church group's right of free speech by denying group access
to school property after-hours). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in GoodNews
Club v. Milford Central School, 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000), in which similar issues are
raised. See 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000).
6. See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that school's
denial of reimbursement to a religious student publication violated students' free speech
rights).
7. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
8. See id. at 2536-37.
9. 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
10. See id. at 2278-79.
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conspicuous and important disagreement between plurality Justices
and concurring Justices, explicitly overruled several Burger-Era
precedents on the subject of school aid1 1 and potentially opened the
door to substantial provision of in-kind benefits by government to
all schools, including the most sectarian among them.
What has not been recognized sufficiently, and what this Essay
will demonstrate, is that the law has been tending for the past
fifteen to twenty years in the direction captured by the decisions at
the end of June 2000. Cases like Mitchell are no longer at the center
of our constitutional culture wars, and cases like Santa Fe have
replaced them. This appraisal of comparative trends, moreover, is

not limited to the legal landscape; within the political culture as
well, the center of gravity of Establishment Clause controversy has
shifted away from issues involving government money and toward
issues of government religious messages.' To be sure, the fights
about school vouchers and sectarian schools remain. The Mitchell

split leaves them unresolved for now, but the constitutional issues
in that conflict are for most antagonists a secondary struggle to that
11. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2555-56.
12. Newspaper coverage of Santa Fe and Mitchell reflects this shift. The Santa Fe
decision provoked prominent, front-page headlines in major newspapers. See, e.g., Linda
Greenhouse, Student PrayersMust be Private,CourtReaffirms, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2000,
at Al; Edward Walsh & Bill Miller, School PrayerIs DealtA Blow, WASH. POST, June 20,
2000, at Al. By contrast, the same major dailies treated Mitchell with considerably less
fanfare and interest. On the day Mitchell was decided, it got fourth billing in the New York
Times coverage ofthe Supreme Court's activities. The Elian Gonzalez case, the partial birth
abortion decision, and the case involving the Boy Scouts exclusion of an openly gay Eagle
Scout all receivedfront-page treatment, while coverage of the Mitchell decisionwas relegated
to page 27. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Approve U.S. Financing of Religious
Schools' Equipment, N.Y. TmS, June 29,2000, at A27. Similarly, the Washington Post's
stories about the Court's rulings in the Elian Gonzalez matter, the partial birth abortion
case, and the Boy Scouts case all ran on page one while the Mitchell case was reported on
page 13. See Kenneth Cooper, A Win for ParochialSchools, WASH. POST, June 29, 2000, at
A13. The tendency in the national newspapers to highlight stories about state-sponsored
religious speech and its constitutional implications extends beyond Supreme Court decisions.
See, e.g., Patricia Davis & Liz Seymour, ACLU Challenges Virginia's Minute of Silence,
WASH. POST, June 23, 2000, at B1 (discussing ACLU's attempt to overturn Virginia law that
requires public schools to begin each day with a minute of silence); Hanna Rosin & William
Claiborne, Taking the Commandments Public, WASH. POST, Feb. 8,2000, at A3 (discussing
legislation in Indiana and elsewhere permitting public schools and other public buildings to
post copies of the Ten Commandments); Craig Thnberg, Bible'sSecond Coming,WASH. POST,
June 4, 2000, at Al (discussing controversy over public schools' use of the Bible as a source
of history and literature).
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concerning public finance, education, and the future of public
schools.
What remains of the once popular notion of "separation of church
and state" has little if anything to do with churches;"3 rather, the
remnants of separationism attach most doggedly to questions of
state sponsorship of religious messages and themes. Religious
entities are in ever-expanding political partnership with the state
in the provision of public service. 1 Although important issues of
client access and the scope of regulatory monitoring remain in
connection with such partnerships, the voices condemning these
arrangements per se on classical separationist grounds are
diminishing.15 By contrast, the political and cultural wars over the
and
place of traditional Judeo-Christian values, themes, prayers,
16
strident.
more
been
never
have
life
public
in
holidays
This Essay explains, chronicles, and analyzes this inversion of
focus on matters of money and message in the law of the
13. The major exception to this proposition, little noticed in the popular culture, concerns
issues of the legal autonomy of religious institutions. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83
F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a church-controlled university was constitutionally
and statutorily immune from a suit alleging sex discrimination for refusal to tenure a female
professor).
14. See generally Stephen V. Monsma, The 'Pervasively Sectarian"Standardin Theory
and Practice,13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL Y 321 (1999) (chronicling the longstanding "partnership between government and nonprofit service organizations, including
faith-based ones"). Both major party candidates for the Presidency in 2000 favored suchjoint
ventures. See, e.g., Gail Russell Chaddock, Waron PovertyEnlists Churches,THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, June 19,2000, at 1 (reporting that civil libertarians were stunned when
Vice President Gore "staked out" grounds similar to George W. Bush on "charitable choice"
programs); Glen Elsasser, Faith-BasedCharitiesGain FederalFavor,CHI. TRIB., June 18,
2000, at 3, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Chicago Tribune File (describing both Gore
and Bush as endorsing closer government ties to operations of faith-based groups who deal
with problems such as unemployment, drug abuse and juvenile crime); Jennifer Moore &
Grant Williams, Gore Vows "New Partnership"with Religious Groups, THE CHRONICLE OF
PHILANTHROPY, June 15, 2000, at 43 (describing both Al Gore and George W. Bush as
supportive of an array of charitable choice programs).
15. See Moore &Williams, supranote 14, at45 (describing opposition to charitable choice
programs as coming from strict separationist groups like Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, and liberal, secularist groups like People for the American Way).
16. Some school districts have openly defied judicial rulings on the subject. See Sandy
Louey, Pre-GamePrayersto Continue, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 15, 1999, at 111,
available in LEXIS, News Library, The Dallas Morning News File. The U.S. House of
Representatives thought the issue of pregame prayer was sufficiently important to enact a
resolution on the subject. See H.R. Con. Res. 199, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REC. H1l,325
(daily ed. Nov. 2, 1999).
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Establishment Clause. Part I briefly describes a set of social and
political characteristics that prevailed at the time of the framing of
the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and explains why material
support of churches by government was a foundational concern of
those in the late-eighteenth century. Part H sweeps through a
series of social and political changes that the succeeding two
centuries have brought and connects these changes to dynamic
pressures on the law of nonestablishment. Part III attaches legal
developments to the historical recitations of Parts I and II and
charts with particularity the evolution of corresponding
Establishment Clause controversies and norms. Part IV briefly
defends the trend revealed in this evolution, and identifies issues
on the cutting edge of matters of money and message. 7 The piece
concludes that controversies about both government money and
government messages will continue with some intensity in the
immediate future, but that their respective trajectories have
crossed and are unlikely to recross in the foreseeable future.
I. RELIGIoN AND GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME OF THE FRAMING
It would not be sensible to rehash the lengthy and complex
history of religious disestablishment in the early American states. 8
Instead, a small number of observations that bear upon questions
of government money and government messages, respectively,
seems appropriate.
First, in terms of participation in, control of, and influence over
government, the late-eighteenth century was clearly a time of
Anglo-Saxon Protestant hegemony. 9 To be sure, early America
17. For the remainder of this Essay, I will use the phrases "government money" and
"government messages," without the quotation marks, to refer to the respective concerns of
government support of religion by means of wealth transfer and substantive message.
18. Much good work on the subject is available. See, e.g., THOMAS E. BUCLEY, CHURCH
AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787 (1977); THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST
FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1986); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1994).
19. At the time of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, only
Protestants could hold public office in many of the states. See Gerard V. Bradley, The No
Religious Test Clauseand the ConstitutionofReligiousLiberty:A Machine that Has Gone of
Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674,681-82 (1987).
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included some Catholics, a small number of Jews, and a substantial
number of non-Christian Native Americans and Africans held to
slavery;20 with the exception of Catholics in Maryland, however,
these groups exercised little or no political influence.. Indeed, the
non-Christians among them either barely belonged to the political
culture, as in the case of Jews, or were excluded from that culture
altogether, as was true of African Americans. Pan-Protestantism
did not exclude the possibility of sectarian rivalries within the
Protestant tradition, and such conflicts occasionally enflamed the
community. 2 Some were essentially theological, and concerned
matters of liturgy and paths to salvation. Others more directly
concerned government; these included issues of incorporation of
churches, control over church lands, authority to ordain ministers,
control over administration of sacraments, and, of course, coercive
taxation for support of religious institutions.22
What surely was not an issue was the question of the
appropriateness of generic theism and Christianity as themes that
government officials might propound, formally and otherwise. As
Steven Smith argued so persuasively a decade ago,' the early years
of American culture reflected the predominance of religious
thought, consciousness, and discourse. 24 Although the significance
of human rationality had been elevated by the Enlightenment, the
concept of "the secular," denoting a sphere separate from the
20. See generally George Dargo, ReligiousToleration and its Limits in EarlyAmerica,16
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 341, 354-60 (discussing the experience of Catholics, Jews, Native

Americans and African slaves as religious minorities in the colonial area).
21. See BUCKLEY, supra note 18, at 14 (recalling that the Separatist Baptists in the
Virginia colony refused to obtain permits for meeting houses and licenses to preach and, as
a result, were subject to fines, whippings, and imprisonments); LEVY, supranote 18, at 13
(describing the diverse and multiple establishments of Protestantism in the early North
American colonies, while highlighting religious conflicts within these colonies, such as the
dispute between the Church of England and non-Anglican Protestants over the statutorily
mandated appointment of a "'good and sufficient Protestant Minister" in New York).
22. See BUCKLEY, supra note 18, at 11-12 (describing the tithes in Colonial Virginia,

which were used to support ministers ofthe Anglican Church, as a source ofdiscontent and
resentment for those who were not members of the church); LEVY, supranote 18, at 11-22
(chronicling disputes between religious groups in colonial America over appointment of
ministers in New York and payment of taxes by Quakers and Baptists in predominantly
Congregationalist Massachusetts).
23. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149 (1991).

24. See id. at 156-66.
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influence of religious conviction and ideology, had not yet fully
emerged. It is thus quite unsurprising that, in early postcolonial
America, even those who might have been most skeptical of what
Professor Smith describes as the religious justifications for religious
freedom tended to include religious rhetoric in support of
arguments for religious freedom or nonestablishment. 5 For
example, Madison, in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance,
invokes the allegiance of every man to the "Governor of the
Universe" and the "Universal Sovereign" as superior to his
obligations to the state or "Civil Society."2 6 Yet more strikingly, the
Virginia "Bill for Religious Freedom,"' authored by Thomas
Jefferson, begins with a declaration that "Almighty God hath
created the mind free " 2 8 and goes on in its preamble to assert that
state interference with religious freedom is a "departure from the
plan of the Holy Author of our religion." 9
It is unimaginable that any twenty-first-century enactment by
government would include such explicitly theological language, and
highly likely that any similarly framed enactment, whatever it
otherwise contained, would be attacked as an unconstitutional
"endorsement" of religion. In the late-eighteenth century, however,
such an attack on legal grounds would have been equally
unimaginable.
What the Virginians and others did fight about, and what then
became the primary focus in our legacy of nonestablishment, was
not government speech. It was government money. More precisely,
it was coercive taxation of the populace to raise money that
would be redistributed to the benefit of the established Anglican
church, or a state-approved set of Christian churches. Coercive
taxation of all Virginians to support the Anglican Church ended
only after fierce quarrels in the first, postindependence legislative
session in 1776.0 The subsequent tale of the proposed Virginia "Bill

25. See id. at 153-66.
26. 1 JAMEs MADISON, Memorialand Remonstrance, in LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF JAMS MADISON 162, 162 (1865).
27. 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE 84 (William Waller Hening ed.) (1823).
28. Id.
29. Id.

30. See BUCKLEY, supra note 18, at 8-37.
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Establishing A Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion,""'
against which Madison aimed his Memorial and Remonstrance,
reveals all of the key elements of controversy. Arising as it did in an
era that, compared to our own, involved far more limited government and far greater economic scarcity, the proposed Assessment
played into a number of critical themes in the Virginia of its time.
The Assessment involved coercive taxation for the direct support of
taxpayer-designated Christian faith. The monies were to be
dedicated to the salaries of teachers or ministers of Christianity, or
to the construction of "places of divine [Christian] worship."32
Taxpayers were to have the option of directing their payments to
"the encouragement of seminaries of learning""3 rather than to a
Christian religious denomination, but no such seminaries yet
existed. As a result, the scheme contained overwhelming incentives
to designate payments for the direct support of one's own
(Christian) denomination.
Looked at through twenty-first-century eyes, the Virginia
Assessment looks "obviously" unconstitutional by virtually any
current measure of Establishment Clause validity. The scheme was
limited to Christian sects and treated some differently from
others.3 " Its benefits would have gone directly to the religious
mission of these sects, including the support of pastors and the
construction of houses of worship. Simply described, the scheme
directly and purposefully advanced sectarian religion.
Although Madison surely saw the scheme as doing exactly that,
perhaps others in the eighteenth century understood it to
accomplish what we would now describe as "secular" purposes.
Churches were centers of community life in general, and teachers
of the gospel were "professional" educators. If notions of secular
purpose and secular effects had existed at that time, the
Assessment's proponents would have argued that it fell within such
standards, difficult as such a conclusion may now seem to us. To
31. The full text of the Bill is set out in the Appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissenting
opinion in Everson v. Boardof Education,330 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1947).
32. Id. at 74.
33. Id.
34. Quakers and Menonists were to be permitted to dispose offunds designated for them
"in a manner which they shall think best calculated to promote their particular mode of
worship." Id.
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put the point differently, one might say that promotion of a
singular, Protestant Christian community, schooled in the Gospel
and well housed for prayer, was thought by some to serve the
purposes of social stability and cohesion as well as to serve God. 5
Whether he was mindful of any distinction between secular and
religious aims of aid to sectarian institutions, Madison viewed
government coercion of support for religion as an evil. He
persuasively contended for rejection of the Assessment measure.
Moreover, thanks to the opinions in Everson v. Board of
Education,6 the story of his success in Virginia, and the subsequent
enactment in that state of Jefferson's Bill For Religious
Liberty-religious preamble and all-have substantially influenced
the development of contemporary Establishment Clause norms. For
more than fifty years, American constitutional law has included a
rock-bottom prohibition on coercive taxation for the direct support
of the religious mission of sectarian institutions. For such purposes, all would now agree, government money may not be used.
H. THE RELIGIOUS TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA
The social, cultural, religious, political, and legal landscape of
America has been transformed radically from that which confronted
Madison, his Virginia contemporaries, and the drafters of the Bill
of Rights in the late 1780s and early 1790s. Furthermore, it is
relatively easy to see how a number of these transformations have
had particularized effects on the law of nonestablishment.
A. Civil War, Immigration,and the Rise of Religious Pluralism
Recall that the dominant political forces at the .time of the
Framing were Anglo-Saxon and Protestant. Indeed, forty years
later, Justice Story could argue in his treatise on the Constitution
that the purpose of the prohibition in Article VI on test oaths as a
condition of federal office was not to diminish Christianity, but to
ensure that "the Catholic and the Protestant, the Calvinist and the
35. See Smith, supranote 23, at 164-65.
36. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Both the majority opinion and Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion
emphasized the Virginia history of anti-establishment themes.
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Arminian, the Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at the common
table ofthe national councils without any inquisition into their faith
or mode of worship."3 7 Moreover, according to Story, "[tihe real
object of the [First Amendment] was not to countenance, much less
to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating
Christianity; but to exclude all rivalries among Christian sects."38
By the middle of the nineteenth century, Catholic immigration
and the rise of common schools with a decidedly Anglo-Saxon
character laid the foundation for the earliest American struggles
over government-sponsored religious speech. 9 These conflicts
tended to be local and not national-because of uneven immigration
patterns and the locus of authority over education-but by the
1850s, nativist, anti-Catholic sentiment had crystallized into the
formation of the Native American Party, which had membership
requirements of white Protestant American ancestry.40
As a result of industrialization, the Western expansion, and the
end of race slavery in America, coupled with European circumstances that made emigration an attractive option, the demography
of America began to change more radically after the 1860s. Waves
of immigration brought groups that did not fit the prevailing
cultural norms. Catholics arrived in large numbers, Jews in smaller
ones. The presence of significant numbers of Catholics, who tended
to be concentrated in the northeastern industrial states, brought
about conflict over government money. In particular, controversy
arose over the financing of education, in common schools and
Catholic schools, and over government speech, especially the use of
a Protestant rather than Catholic version of the Bible as a text in
the common schools. These controversies, reflecting the fracturing
of Protestant hegemony in America, 4 eventually found expression
37. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
(5th ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1891) (citation omitted).
38. I& at 631-32.

STATES

634

39. For a good synthesis ofthese developments, see ROSEMARY C. SALAMONE,VISIONS OF
SCHOOLING: CONSCIENCE, COMMUNITY, AND COMMON EDUCATION 14-20 (2000).

40. See id. at 20.
41. The religiously based response to Catholic immigration among nativist Protestants
in turn produced a strictly separationist reaction among a group of self-consciously "secular
liberals." See Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 277-330 (Jan. 19, 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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in the mid-1870s in a proposal by Republican presidential aspirant
James Blaine.42 Blaine, seeking to exploit Protestant-Catholic
tensions, proposed the following amendment to the federal
constitution:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money
raised by taxation in any State for the support of public schools,
or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands
devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious
sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be
divided between religious sects or denominations.4 3
As is evident from the text, the proposal had two main thrusts.
One was to accomplish what incorporation of the Religion Clauses
eventually brought about-the imposition of federal constitutional
norms of religious freedom on the states. Because there were
literally no decided cases under the Religion Clauses at the time,
the content of those norms was decidedly unclear. The other more
pointed and direct aim of the Blaine Amendment was to create a
constitutional obstacle to public financing of sectarian (i.e.,
Catholic) education. This rather blatantly anti-Catholic proposal
was thus primarily about government money, and, despite its
failure, set the stage for later judicially created doctrines designed
to have the same effect.
The larger story of the Blaine Amendment, however, includes
very prominent questions about government speech as well. As if
prescient on the subject of the Warren Court's decisions of nearly a
century later about prayer and Bible-reading in public schools,
many who supported the Blaine Amendment were concerned that
its first section might lead to the exclusion of Protestant Biblereading from school exercises and lessons. As the proposed
amendment worked its way through the legislative process prior to
its ultimate failure on the floor of the Senate," the question of its
potential effects on government speech received considerable
42. See generally Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AMER. J.
LEGAL HIST. 38 (1992) (recounting the history of the Blaine Amendment).
43. Id. at 53 n.96 (citing 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875)).
44. See id. at 67.
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attention.4 5 Significant support for the amendment came from those
who opposed government money to support private Catholic schools,
but were explicitly in favor of public schools in which government
speech could maintain a Protestant flavor.4 6 Thus, in our first great
national political debate about the meaning of the Religion Clauses
as applied to matters of education of the young, the concern over
the expenditure of government money in support of ecclesiastical
institutions rose to the fore and the concern about government
speech produced, if anything, a broad sentiment in favor of
Protestant Bible-reading in public institutions.
That government speech might raise constitutional issues was
also reflected in the comments of Thomas Cooley, the leading
American constitutional scholar of the late-nineteenth century, who
wrote in his treatise: "But while thus careful to establish, protect,
and defend religious freedom and equality, the American constitutions contain no provisions which prohibit the authorities from
such solemn recognition of a superintending Providence in public
transactions and exercises as the general religious sentiment of
mankind inspires .... "7
Cooley was expressing the consensus of Protestant cultural
control, but the very fact of his assertion suggests that that
consensus was under attack from those who did not share its
premises. Moreover, immigration and its consequences for the
religious demography of the United States did not stop with the
immediate aftermath of the Civil War. The changes in immigration
law and policy in the last quarter of the twentieth century have
contributed substantially to the increasing religious diversity in
America. One can now add to the pattern of nineteenth-century
Catholic immigration and early-twentieth-century Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe, the influx ofMoslems, Buddhists, and
other religious groups from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, and
large numbers of Catholics from Latin America. As will be
developed further below, the rise of the religious neutrality
45. See id. at 51-52, 61.
46. See id. at 61 (describing efforts of conservative evangelical Christians who supported
the anti-aid efforts reflected in the Blaine Amendment while simultaneously attempting to
prevent federal constitutional interference with Bible-reading in public schools).
47. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 668-69 (7th

ed. 1903).
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principle and its corollary requirement of equal access to
government resources can be directly traced to the truly multicultural quality of America's religious pluralism.
B. Racial Justice,Civil Rights, and the Rise of the Equality
Paradigm
The Civil War and its aftermath would prove to have profound
consequences for the constitutional law of religion as well as that of
race." The Reconstruction Amendments themselves represented a
form of immigration; as reflected in the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its rejection of the holding in Dred
Scott v. Sandford,49 these constitutional changes brought African
Americans, already on our shores, into the body politic from a place
outside of it.
The racial integration of the American political community in
turn affected the constitutional law of religion in several ways.
First, and most significantly, the rise of the Civil Rights Movement
propelled a new ethos of rights adjudication. Equal protection
norms, once easily dismissed as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments,"" took on central significance in the corpus of
constitutional law. As a result, arguments for religious equality
acquired increased vitality in a variety of constitutional settings.
Whether the claim is one of forbidden sectarian preferences, 51 or
equal access to government resources, 2 or covert government
hostility to a particular set of religious practices,5 3 equality norms
54
have infused Religion Clause law for the past quarter century.
48. Fora focused discussion ofthe impact ofthe Reconstruction Amendments onreligious
liberty in the states, see Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause:
Religious Exemptions Under the FourteenthAmendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.1106 (1994).

49. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
50. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
51. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (invalidating statute that granted
covert denominational preferences).
52. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993) (involving church group's claim ofequal access to after-school use of school premises).
53. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(invalidating local ordinances that covertly discriminated against religious group that
employed animal sacrifice as part of its religious rituals).
54. Although equality norms at times have expanded constitutionalintervention against
government practices, similar norms have operated to contract intervention under the Free
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Second, the rise of black churches itself eventually became a
phenomenon of national political import. Black churches as a
political force were at the heart of the Civil Rights Movement, and
the continued segregation of religious life in America has been
among the explanatory causes of the push for charitable choice in
federal programs to aid the disadvantaged.' Religion now plays a
central role in identity politics, within which white and black
churches alike play crucial roles.56
C. The Rise of Secularism and the Culture Wars
As discussed briefly above, the concept of secularism as a world
view had not penetrated American culture in the late-eighteenth
and early-nineteenth centuries.57 To be sure, the French Revolution
had celebrated the rights of man, independent of the view of any
organized religious body. Moreover, the writings of Thomas Paine
and others at the time of the American Revolution had echoed
related sentiments. Nevertheless, these radical notions had not yet
been embraced as a respectable aspect of American life, much less
a dominant one.
By the late-nineteenth century, the blossoming of science and
technology, the horrors associated with the Civil War, and the
alienation accompanying the Industrial Revolution had all
contributed to the rise of secularism. The holocausts and mass
violence in Europe in the twentieth century reinforced the trend, as
Exercise Clause by reducing claims of religious liberty or privilege to claims of no more than
formal equality for religion. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For
expansion of this theme, see Douglas Laycock, The Remnants ofFreeExercise, 1990 SUP. Or.
REV. 1.
55. See W. Burlette Carter, CanThis CultureBe Saved?AnotherAffirmativeActionBaby
Reflects on Religious Freedom, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 507-09 (1995) (book review)
(suggesting that African American churches may have a different perspective on religious
freedom issues than many predominantly European American churches); Jeffrey Rosen, Is
NothingSecular?,N.Y. TiIrns, Jan. 30,2000, (Magazine), at 40 (discussing African American
churches and their support for charitable choice programs).
56. The movements spawned by these groupings have included the American Center for
Law and Justice (ACLJ), which has sponsored and financed a considerable portion of the
Religion Clause litigation in the Supreme Court over the past twenty years. The ACLJ tends
to represent the causes of conservative white Christians, and its lawyers, most notably Jay
Sekulow, have participated as lead counsel in a number of Supreme Court cases. See, e.g.,
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384.
57. See supranotes 23-29 and accompanying text.
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did widespread improvement in material conditions. There can now
be no doubt that American culture has a heavy, self-consciously
secularist component. This of course has profoundly altered our
understandings of religion, religious freedom, and religious
establishment.5" Without secularism, there can be no struggle
between religion and "nonreligion" of the sort frequently invoked by
courts and commentators. 59 Without secularism, the culture wars
of the past thirty years 6 -- be they about sexuality, abortion,

criminal justice, or welfare reform-could not have taken the shape
they did. With secularism as a self-conscious social force, our most
prominent religious conflict is no longer the struggle among
Christians that plagued the West for hundreds of years, including
most prominently that of Catholics pitted against Protestants.
Instead, America's religious strife emerges from the gap in world
view between secularists and deeply committed religious believers.
As will be elucidated below, this phenomenon has glacially shaped
the law of government money and government messages alike.
D. Expanded Prosperityand Wealth, and the ChangedRole of
Government
The "night watchman" state constituted the prevailing model for
the world of Madison and Jefferson. No public schools existed at the
time of the Framing, and what we now think of as "social services"
belonged to the domain of the churches. All of that has been
radically transformed. Brown v. Board of Education's6 dictum
about the central role of education in American life in the twentieth
century is now commonly accepted, and the phenomenon that

58. For an excellent analysis and discussion of the ways in which the rise of secular
individualism has altered our understanding of the Religion Clauses, see FREDERICKMARK
GEDIcKS, THE RHEToRIc OF CHURCH AND STATE (1995).
59. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and EqualLiberty, 42 WMi. & MARY L.
REV. 1007 (2001); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience: The ConstitutionalBasis for ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. Cm. L. REV.
1245 (1994).
60. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS (1991) (describing cultural conflicts

between orthodox and progressive world views in the areas of family, education, media, the
arts, law, and electoral politics).
61. 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
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dictum described has accelerated in the half century since it was
uttered.
The rise of education as an American preoccupation has
powerfully shaped the law of the Religion Clauses. Fueled by the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause and its application to the
states, the conflicts over public financing of Catholic schools and
religious exercises in public schools commanded the stage upon
which played out the first three decades of Supreme Court
adjudication of Establishment Clause issues. Now that the heavy
focus on the role of Catholic education has diminished as an issue
for government, the highly charged question of public vouchers for
private education has taken its place on the constitutional agenda.
Although the vouchers question is clearly more ecumenical in its
demographic contours than was the last generation's struggle over
public financing of Catholic schools, the constitutional permissibility of vouchers for use at sectarian schools remains a central
and unresolved issue.
Schools aside, even those among the Framers who contemplated
a strong, aggressive, commercially oriented central government
never could have imagined the size of the federal revenue base
brought about by two centuries of economic expansion and
constitutional change that created the federal power to taxincomes.
A trillion-dollar federal budget, decades of federal involvement in
social expenditures, and a decline in confidence in the ability of
government bureaucracy on any level to administer social services
have conspired successfully to create the phenomenon of, and
62
gathering momentum toward, the regime of charitable choice.
Under charitable choice arrangements-unthinkable under the
constitutional and political ethos prevailing thirty years ago-religious institutions are well on their way to becoming major actors
in the distribution of government funds and in-kind benefits,
especially social services. That religious entities will play a
communitarian role in the identification and alleviation of need is
62. The most prominent charitable choice provision in federal law is that contained in
section (a)(1)(A) of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2161 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp.
1997)), which permits states that contract with private organizations for welfare service
delivery to include religious organizations among the set of contractors. See also infra note

214 for a listing of other charitable choice proposals.
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that such a role will be

massive, government-supported and well financed, because of
coercive taxation and the privatization of the delivery of social
welfare services, suggests significant new circumstances within

which to evaluate the force of Establishment Clause norms
concerning the use of government money.

E. Mass Communication and the Rapid Transmissionof Symbols
The last in the list of all-too-obvious changes in American society
that bear upon Establishment Clause concerns is the rise of mass
communications and the rapid transmission ofpictures and symbols
around the globe. Eye-catching pictures have always been worth
many words, but the accuracy of renderings and the speed of their
transmission have improved many times over between the Framers'
time and our own.
This phenomenon of course has sweeping consequences for mass
societies, far beyond its effect on law in general, or upon the small
corner of Religion Clause law in particular. But its effects can be
felt in those aspects of political and legal culture to which the
transmission of symbols matters. If a city sponsors a voucher
system for youth in its public schools, as have Cleveland and
Milwaukee," the story is transmitted at various times around the
nation; however, it tends to be a story about relatively anonymous
families and children making choices among schools, or about
lawyers fussing over financing arrangements. That funds will pass,
pursuant to such arrangements, from city to parents to sectarian
school is evident in the story, but this triangulated financial
relationship cannot be neatly captured in an image.
By contrast, Christmas birth scenes, Chanukah candleholders,
Christian crosses, and plaques containing the Ten Commandments
represent images familiar to a great many Americans. When these
63. The"poor laws" developed in Elizabethan England included a significant role for local
parishes in the raising of monies and its distribution. See KAPL DE SCHWEINITZ, ENGLAND'S
ROAD TO SOCIAL SECURITY 25-26 (1943).
64. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (enjoining, on
Establishment Clause grounds, operation of Cleveland voucher program), affd, Nos. 003055/00-3060/00-3063, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31367, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2000); Jackson
v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998) (upholding Milwaukee voucher program against
federal and state constitutional attack).
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images are replicated in scenes of public controversy, they are
quickly transmitted through news media. Members of the public
can react quickly, and viscerally, to the question of the desirability
of public support for such symbols and messages. In a fast-moving
political culture in which visual images dominate public focus,
public controversy over matters of government speech about
religion can be expected to take precedence over issues of government money in support of religion.
In sum, the social, political, ideological, and economic
developments over the past two centuries have expanded and
altered the commonwealth. Claims of equal access to that
commonwealth, and political and judicial receptivity to those
claims, have grown in proportion to those changes. By contrast, the
polity exhibits far more tension over government support of
religious symbols and messages, with respect to which "equality" or
"neutrality" in any form is not possible. Religious pluralism and the
decline ofwhite Protestant supremacyhave liberated the possibility
of government financial support for the secular efforts of religious
entities, while simultaneously increasing the political controversy,
and constitutional constraints, associated with government
religious speech.

III. MONEY AND SPEECH IN THE EVOLUTION OF ESTABLISHMENT
NORMS
The forces described in Part II-pluralism, egalitarianism,
secularism, prosperity, the expanded role of government, and the
revolution in communications-help to explain the rising trajectory
of constitutional concerns about government speech and the falling
trajectory of comparable concerns about government money. The
path of the law in this area, though hardly linear, has tended to
conform to that description of comparative trajectories.
A. Pre-incorporation
There was little occasion for adjudication on issues of money or
speech prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in 1947 that the
Establishment Clause applied to the states by virtue of its
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incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.65 Very few federal
activities implicated what we now consider to be Establishment
Clause issues, and the sort of civil libertarian interest groups that
might litigate such issues either did not exist or did not focus on
Religion Clause questions. Only two Supreme Court decisions prior
to 1947 raised Establishment Clause questions; both involved
government money, and in neither did the Court directly confront
the constitutional merits.
In Bradfield v. Roberts,66 the Court rejected an Establishment
Clause challenge to a federal appropriation for a hospital, operated
under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church in the District of
Columbia. The Court held that the hospital was a secular rather
than religious entity, and therefore did not reach the question of the
permissibility of government grants to religious institutions." In
Quick Bear v. Leupp,68 the Court held that expenditures out of a
Sioux Indian Trust Fund for the education of Sioux children at
sectarian schools did not violate federal statutory prohibitions on
sectarian expenditures. The Court reasoned that although the
statutory prohibitions should be construed in light of constitutional
concerns, the statute simply did not apply to Indian trust funds
administered by the United States under a treaty with the tribe.69
Such funds were not "government" funds, and so prohibitions on use
of government money did not apply.
B. Incorporationof the Establishment Clause and the Early PostincorporationCases
In 1947, the Supreme Court issued its landmark opinion in
Everson v. Boardof Education.71Everson, of course, was a government money case; it involved a decision by a municipal government
to reimburse families for the cost of transporting their children on
public buses to and from both public and sectarian schools. The
Court inEversonupheld the program, even though it produced a set
65. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
66. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
67. See id. at 298.
68. 210 U.S. 50 (1908).

69. See id. at 80.
70. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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of highly separationist opinions-all of which strongly signaled that
any program of direct governmental assistance to sectarian schools
was likely doomed to invalidation under the Establishment
Clause.7 1
There are many reasons why Everson's legacy has proven to be
lasting. The decision was the first attempt by the Supreme Court to
elaborate on the meaning of the Establishment Clause. Although
the Court permitted the aid in question, its opinion was sweeping,
suggesting that broad separationist principles would govern churchstate controversies thereafter. The dissents were even more
expansive; both the Rutledge and Jackson dissents were vehement
attacks on the case outcome, and both argued that the state may
give no financial assistance to sectarian enterprises, even if given
indirectly through subsidies for ancillary activities like transportation.7 2 All of the opinions assumed without question that the
application of the Establishment Clause to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment was appropriate, and all assumed that the
Virginia history ofdisestablishment, capped by Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance7' against the proposed religious assessment of
1785, should be taken as controlling background against which to
read the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
Everson may have been driven by anti-Catholic animus. The
Court opinion by Justice Black, late of the Klan, was subtle about
the ideology of Catholic education; the dissent by Justice Jackson
was not.7 4 In any event, the Justices in Everson understood that
application of the Establishment Clause to the states would have
profound consequences for the public financing of sectarian
education, almost all of which at the time was associated with, and
operated by, the Roman Catholic Church. This had been the issue
that had driven the Blaine Amendment,' and it propelled the Court
to federalize the question by concluding that the Establishment
Clause applied to the states.
71. See id. at 18-74. The case was decided by a vote of 54, with two strongly worded
dissenting opinions by Justices Jackson and Rutledge.
72. See id.
73. See 1 MADISON, supra note 26.
74. Justice Jackson minced few words when he noted that "Catholic education is the rock
upon which the whole [religion] rests." Everson, 330 U.S. at 24.
75. For a discussion of the Blaine Amendment, see supranotes 42-46 and accompanying
text.
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The period between World War II and the appointment of Earl
Warren as Chief Justice in 1953 also witnessed a sharply drawn
Establishment Clause controversy that fell along lines oblique to
the distinction between government money and government speech.
In McCollum v. Board of Education,6 the Supreme Court invalidated a program of religious instruction conducted by sectarian
teachers on public school grounds during school hours." A few years
later, after howls of public criticism in response to McCollum, the
Court in Zorach v. Clauson" rejected an Establishment Clause
challenge to a program in which public school students were given
released time from compulsory school hours to attend religious
instruction at private rather than public sites.79
The off-site versus on-site distinction is highly questionable;
Zorach has always seemed to me wrongly decided. 0 With respect
to the money-speech dichotomy, however, the problems presented
byMcCollum and Zorach do not fall readily into one category or the
other. Both cases involved the provision of government resources in
aid of religion, and religion alone; in McCollum, the resources
included the obvious one of space in the public schools for religious
instruction,8 and both cases involved placing the force of the state's
laws on compulsory attendance and truancy behind a parent's
choice to have a child partake of religious instruction. At the same
time, both cases also involved the symbolic and expressive force of
putting coercive government power, and not government money
alone, behind the project ofreligious instruction for children. Thus,
McCollum and Zorach arguably involved government resources for
religion alone, symbolic government support for religion, and
proreligious government coercion-a combination that one today
would expect to be fatal to any government policy challenged on
Establishment Clause grounds. Perhaps the vintage of these cases,
decided at an early and intense stage of the Cold War, explains the
outcome in Zorach. Indeed, the case is perhaps best known for its
76. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
77. See id. at 207-12.
78. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
79. See id.at 308-10, 315.
80. See Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 743, 74346 (1992).
81. See Mcollum, 333 U.S. at 207-09.
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propagandistic dictum that "[wle are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 2 In any event, the
McCollum-Zorach episode is an intriguing tangent story to the
speech-money dichotomy being pursued in this Essay.
C. The Warren Court
Although the Warren Court is justly considered to be the
institutional force behind much of the current status of the Bill of
Rights, its contribution to the law of the Establishment Clause is
less significant than that of its successors. The most influential
Warren Court opinions are, of course, those involving religious
exercises in public schools. In Engel v. Vitale,' the Court held
unconstitutional the compulsory daily reading of the Regents'
Prayer in the New York public schools. 4 InAbington SchoolDistrict
v. Schempp,8 5 decided one year later, the Court ruled similarly in a
case involving daily Bible-readings and recitation of the Lord's
Prayer in public schools.86
In a way, Engel and Schempp are the germinal government
speech cases; they are the Court's first encounter with claims that
government-initiated religious exercises or worship, independent of
affiliation of any kind with institutional churches, violate the
Establishment Clause. Moreover, the Court's studied and explicit
rejection of the argument that Engel and Schempp should be
treated as involving Free Exercise problems alone, or as being in
some way akin to flag salutes-with respect to which complainants
are entitled to exemption but are not entitled to block the
government's power to conduct the exercise -makes these cases
uniquely important.
Several aspects of Engel and Schempp, however, render them
problematic as precedent for any broad view that the Establishment
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
See id. at 424.
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
See id. at 205-07.
See West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that state may

not require students to salute the American flag); Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist.,
980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that flag salute is not a prayer and may be recited

voluntarily in public schools).

20011

GOVERNMENT MESSAGES AND GOVERNMENT MONEY

793

Clause interdicts official religious speech. First and foremost, their
settings involved compulsion at several levels. The exercises took
place in a setting in which minors were legally required to attend
school, and under significant psychological pressure from teachers
and peers to participate. Moreover, the participation expected was
active, not passive. In Engel, children were obliged to recite the
Regent's Prayer,8 and in Schempp, they were expected to read
aloud from the Bible and recite the Lord's Prayer in unison. 9 These
requirements of vocal participation made the intrusion on religious
autonomy far more severe than would be the case in a regime
involving silent acquiescence alone; to express aloud a religious
sentiment is to affirm it or to openly violate one's conscience by
uttering what one believes to be a religious falsehood.
However sweeping Engel and Schempp seemed to be within the
domain of official religious exercises in public schools-and they
have been sweeping indeed Q-- their factual settings and conceptual
underpinnings narrowed their reach. Neither involved religious
exercises imposed on adults, or religious exercises conducted by
government in a setting in which no one was present by government
compulsion, nor even exercises in which officials spoke but citizens
could remain passively silent. As a result, government-sponsored
religious observance in less coercive settings continued, unrestricted by any clear principles, for another two decades.
The Warren Court's contribution on the government money side
was far more ambiguous in its thrust than its government speech
legacy from the school prayer cases.9 In Board of Education v.
Allen,9" decided at the very end of the Warren Era, a closely divided
88. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 422. Students could be excused from participation by explicit
request of their parents. See id. at 430.
89. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 207. Here, too, a student could be excused "upon the
written request of his parent or guardian." Id. at 205.
90. There are numerous cases that bear the direct imprint ofthe school prayer decisions.
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985);
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
91. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Court upheld Sunday Closing
Laws against an Establishment Clause challenge, but did so on the theory that the
"government speech" reflected in recognizing Sunday (the Christian Sabbath) as the day of
rest had been washed away over time, and that the laws now advanced the secular purpose
of promoting a convenient and uniform day of rest.
92. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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Court upheld a New York program by which textbooks used or
approved for use in the public schools could be loaned to the parents
of children enrolled in private schools, including the sectarian
variety.9" If the Everson Court was correct when it asserted
that providing reimbursement to families for transportation
costs incurred by sending their children to sectarian schools
"approache[d] the verge of [constitutional] power,"94 Allen must be
wrong. Surely the provision of schoolbooks, nominally loaned to
schoolchildren but in fact transferred to sectarian schools directly
once the school adopted the books, is more substantial and direct
aid to the enterprise of sectarian education than reimbursement
for bus transit costs, which can be justified on safety grounds.
Additionally, the interaction between public officials and sectarian
school officials over which books would be "approved for use"
(though not necessarily used) in public schools was fraught with the
perils of "excessive entanglement" of the sort the Court had
condemned in Engel95 and would emphasize a few years later in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.9'
Whatever forces account for the result in Allen, one can fairly
conclude that the Warren Court set the stage for the separationist
principles that would later ripen on matters of government speech.
With respect to government money, however, the Warren Court
proved to be a reticent link between the separationist rhetoric of
Everson and the separationist doctrine and result that was soon to
appear in Lemon.
D. The Burger Court-The High Water Mark of Money
Separationismand the Boundariesof Message Separationism
During Warren Burger's tenure as Chief Justice, money
separationism blossomed while the cause of message separationism
suffered some explicit and noteworthy defeats. On the money side,
93. See id. at 243-44.
94. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
95. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-30 (1962).
96. 403 U.S. 602, 614-25 (1971).
97. The Warren Court's only other significant contribution to money separationism was
Flastv. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), which created an Establishment Clause exception to the
general denial of standing to federal taxpayers to challenge the validity of federal
expenditures. See id. at 105-06.
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the leading case is Lemon v. Kurtzman." Lemon, like virtually all
of the Burger-Era cases about aid to sectarian schools at the
elementary and secondary level, involved a large, northeastern
industrial state (in this case Pennsylvania) with a substantial
population of Roman Catholics and the sectarian schools to show for
it. 9 Indeed, the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court in Lemon
emphasized the predominantly Catholic character of the schools
aided by the challenged programs, and highlighted the religious
indoctrination the Court associated with such schools."°°
Lemon's machinery was simple and devastating. The requirement
of secular purpose had no effect in these cases; all aid programs
were found to have permissible, education-oriented purposes.
Instead, the damage was done elsewhere. The Court presumed
parochial schools to be "pervasively sectarian,"'0 ' and created the
infamous catch-22 by virtue of which such schools could not be
substantially aided by the state because the aid would either
significantly advance the school's religious mission, or 'excessively
entangle" state agents with school personnel in an effort to make
sure that
such religious advancement at state expense did not
0 2
1

occur.

As a result, in the first few years after Lemon, the Supreme
Court invalidated numerous programs of aid to sectarian
elementary and secondary schools.10 3 In all of these programs, like
those in Lemon, an overwhelming proportion of the aided schools
were Catholic. Many of the issues raised in these cases, several of
which have now been overruled byMitchell v. Helms,'" involved the
loan of instructional material, such as maps, film projectors, and
the like.0 5 The reasoning in these cases followed a predictable
98. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
99. See id. at 609-10. The case also involved a statute from Rhode Island. See id. at 60709.
100. See ia at 615-22.
101. See id. at 617, 620.
102. See id. at 619-22.
103. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S.
Ct. 2530 (2000); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruledby Mitchell v. Helms, 120
S. Ct. 2530 (2000); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
104. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
105. Why such loans were constitutionally unacceptable, while the textbook loan program
inAllen was valid, was never satisfactorily explained. See, e.g., Wolman, 433 U.S. at 251 n.18
(noting the inconsistency between Allen and Wolman, and choosing to preserve Allen by
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formula: state provision of instructional material to "pervasively
sectarian" schools, to be utilized in the classroom by employees of
these schools, created an unacceptable risk that government aid
would be put to religious use. The only way to ensure that schools
and their employees did not engage in such forbidden uses was to
closely monitor the use of the equipment, and that monitoring itself
would constitute an "excessive entanglement."
The distinction between aid that flows to families by virtue of
their choice of sectarian education, and aid that is transferred
directly to sectarian schools, had seemed to matter in Everson and
Allen, and would matter again near the end of the Burger years.
Nevertheless, in the early 1970s, the Court's firm commitment
against programs designed primarily to bail out financially troubled
Catholic schools overpowered the principled force of that distinction. The Court invalidated an Ohio program involving the loan
of instructional materials to families in Wolman v. Walter,"6 and
also invalidated a New York program of tax credits for tuition
assistance, predominantly utilized by parents of children in
Catholic schools, in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist 0
One distinction that did matter greatly, however, was that
between elementary and secondary schools, on the one hand, and
higher education on the other. In a series of decisions begining with
Tilton v. Richardson,l"' decided on the same day as Lemon, the
Court drew a boundary around higher education. Because such
education involved less impressionable, older students, and because
the Court presumed that such schools were unlikely to indoctrinate
in an atmosphere of pervasive sectarianism, it cast the burden of
proof on challengers to such programs, a burden that they typically
failed to carry. 0 9
By the mid-1970s the doctrines of money separationism had
become essentially a limitation on state aid to Catholic schools at
the elementary and secondary levels. Aid to religiously affiliated
higher education remained presumptively valid so long .as the
reason of stare decisis).
106. 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).

107. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
108. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
109. See Roemerv. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,755-59 (1976); Huntv. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 741-45 (1973); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 684-89.
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aid was limited to secular objectives. Moreover, Walz v. Tax
Commission,11 which upheld property tax exemptions for religious
institutions against an Establishment Clause challenge," 1 reinforced the message of decisions like Lemon. In financial matters,
the ideal of separationism was state and church leaving each other
alone as much as possible. Whether that was accomplished by the
force of constitutional principle operating to limit state aid to
religious entities," or by deference to state policy which relieved
such entities of state imposed burdens, the operational result from
the perspective of religious institutions was distance and disconnection from government agencies.
Near the end of the Burger years, there were small hints of
weakening in the structure of money separationism. The strongest
came in Mueller v. Allen,"' in which a narrowly divided Court
upheld a state income tax deduction for the expenses of elementary
and secondary education, including tuition payments."' Such
payments were deductible whether made at private schools,
sectarian or secular, or at out-of-district public schools." 5 Mueller
confronted the Court, for the first time, with a scheme that aided
parents of children in sectarian schools that were not primarily
Catholic. Although Lemon had emphasized the demography of the
schools in Pennsylvania, the Court inMueller explicitly rejected the
argument that, because the tuition deduction in fact operated to aid
sectarian schools more than all other schools combined, it was
therefore constitutionally unacceptable." Instead, the Court
emphasized the formal neutrality of the state scheme and the fact
that it aided families rather than the schools directly. These factors,
of course, did not distinguishMueller from the Nyquist case decided
ten years earlier, in which the New York tax credit scheme that
110. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
111. See Ud.at 672-78.
112. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grenders Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (holding that state may
not delegate power to veto liquor licenses to churches situated near the site for which the
license is sought).
113. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
114. See id. at 390-91.
115. See id. at 395.
116. See id. at 401. The Court stated, "[We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the
constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which
various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law." Id.
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primarily benefited parents of children in Catholic schools had been
struck down. "117

The second hint of the weakening of money separationism was
Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,11 in
which a unanimous Court upheld a vocational rehabilitation
payment to a blind person who used the funds to pay tuition for a
pastoral training program at a Christian college. 9 The Court
emphasized the small amount of money going to a religious
institution as a result of the program,' but five concurring Justices
also emphasized the structural similarity between the programs
challenged in both Mueller and Witters; both were formally neutral,
and in both cases the decision to use the aid at a religious
institution was not made by the state. 1 ' Whether Mueller and
Witters depended on aid quantity, formal neutrality, intervening
private choice, or the fact that Catholic elementary and secondary
schools were not the primary beneficiaries, were questions left open
for the future.
In the waning years of the Burger Court, a forceful application of
the principles of money separationism unfortunately surfaced one
last time inAguilar v. Felton,'22 which held a federal aid program
unconstitutional. The program provided publicly employed teachers
of remedial education in secular subjects to educationally deprived
children residing in low-income areas.' Unlike the programs
struck down by Lemon and its progeny, the program invalidated in
Aguilar operated nationwide, and aided children in public schools
to precisely the same extent and in the same ways as it aided
children in private schools, sectarian and otherwise. The program
therefore could not fairly be understood as one designed primarily
to help Catholic schools remain afloat, or one that would pit
Catholics against Protestants in a sectarian political fight. The
Aguilar majority nevertheless concluded that the program
presented dangers ofunconstitutional interaction between sectarian
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-89 (1973).
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
See id. at 482.
See id. at 486.
See id. at 490-93.
473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruledby Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
See id. at 404-05.
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schools and public employees, and therefore affirmed a judgment
which prohibited the program from operating on sectarian school
premises. 12
It was apparent from the moment Aguilar was decided that it
would be an attractive target for criticism and eventual overruling
by those who opposed the regime of money separationism. The
program had been designed to help poor, undereducated children,
not to bail out struggling sectarian schools. Its nationwide character
precluded any perception that it provided advantage to any
particular sect. When, in the wake ofAguilar, lower courts upheld
the provision of the federal remedial services to sectarian
schoolchildren off-site ---that is, in trailers or other rented space
in proximity to the sectarian schools in which the program could
no longer be hosted-it became evident that Aguilar was simply
a wasteful and expensive symbol of the principles of money
separationism, unmoored from whatever rationale those principles
had once enjoyed. When those principles began to fracture a few
years later, it turned out to be no surprise that Aguilar was the
first decision in the money separationist line to be explicitly
overruled.'6
The story of message separationism in the Burger Court years
is dramatically different from money separationism. In cases
involving religious speech by public schools, the Burger Court
expanded the legacy of its predecessor to include situations in
which the school did not compel active participation by students.
In two other, nonschool government speech cases decided several
years apart and toward the end of the Burger Era, however, the
Court refused to develop a set of principles that would address the
question of government support for religious messages in the way
Lemon addressed the use of government money.

124. See U at 408,414.
125. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Secretary of Educ., 942 F. Supp. 842, 848-50
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (limiting the holding inAguilar to preclusion of publicly funded teaching on
the premises of sectarian schools).
126. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208-09 (1997).
127. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a state law
requiring a moment of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer in public schools); Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating a state law requiring the posting of a copy ofthe
Ten Commandments in public school classrooms).
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In Marsh v. Chambers, 8 the Court upheld the practice of
beginning each state legislative session with a chaplain's prayer,
despite the fact that the state in question, Nebraska, had utilized
a Presbyterian chaplain, and none from any other faith, for a
number of years." Marsh purported to justify its departure from
general, separationist principles by referring to the history of the
Establishment Clause and the behavior of the First Congress,
which had sent the Establishment Clause to the states for
ratification and almost simultaneously appropriated money to hire
a congressional chaplain.310 No such historical pedigree was
available, however, to explain the outcome in Lynch v. Donnelly,'
in which a narrow majority rejected an Establishment Clause
challenge to a city-sponsored display of a Nativity scene during the
Christmas season.'32 Chief Justice Burger's Lynch opinion, which
was heavily criticized from both inside' and outside. 4 the Court,
notoriously and explicitly strayed from the Establishment Clause
standards the Chief Justice himself had articulated and relied upon
in Lemon thirteen years earlier."'
At the time of Lynch, the Court's refusal to remain confined
within the boundaries of its own announced standards seemed
to represent the worst sort of result-orientation and willful refusal
to be confined by law. Indeed, Justice Brennan argued this point
in dissent," 6 and Justice O'Connor's now famous concurrence, in
which her endorsement-based approach to Establishment Clause
problems was born, echoed that sentiment. 3 7 In retrospect,
however, this judgment may have been too harsh. From the bluff
overlooking the divide between government money and government

128. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
129. See id. at 793-94.
130. See id. at 786-92.
131. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
132. See id. at 681-85.
133. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's
CrumblingWall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKE L.J. 770.
135. After referring to the Lemon criteria, Chief Justice Burger's opinion went on to say
"[We have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or
criterion in this sensitive area." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
136. See id. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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message, one can see that the problems of money and message are
profoundly different, and thus require different solutions.
Issues involving government resources in support of religion
quite frequently involve religious institutions; that is, they are truly
about "church," in the sense of entities of a legal and associational
character. When the state provides resources to such entities, it
typically does so on the theory that churches may effectively assist
in the state's secular work. After all, the state could not possibly
justify aiding churches in their effort to do their own purely
religious work; this would be exactly the sort of policy condemned
by Madison in the Memorial and Remonstrance and by bedrock
American church-state principles grown out of that Madisonian set
of concerns. 8 The only remaining constitutional rationale for state
aid to religious entities rests on the case for enlisting such entities
in accomplishing indisputably secular purposes of government.
Government message cases, however, are very different in their
character. Rather than representing the state as trying to enlist
religious entities in doing the government's secular work,
government message cases involve officials of the state doing the
work of faith institutions-that is, preaching, proselytizing,
teaching about religious holidays and themes, and generally
spreading the Word or respect for the Word. Institutional churches
may or may not be involved in such efforts by the state, but the
constitutional danger of those efforts has little to do with
participation by religious institutions. Government message cases
are not about institutional connection between agencies of
government and agencies of faith. Message cases are rather about
the political misappropriation of religious themes. The dangers of
such efforts are different from the dangers of which Madison spoke,
but it was not until the advent of the Rehnquist Court and a series
of clarifying cases that the essential difference between money
cases and message cases fully crystallized.

138. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
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E. The Rehnquist Court-The Decline of Money Separationism,
and the Rise of Message Separationism
In the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has created and
accelerated the trend toward message separationism, which was
only hinted at during the waning years of the Burger Court. The
Court has also made significant encroachments on the doctrines of
money separationism, although it surely has not rejected them
altogether.
With respect to message separationism, the most important
decision by far is Allegheny County v. ACLU.'3 9 Allegheny County,
decided in 1989, moved the law one huge step forward from Lynch.
In Lynch, Chief Justice Burger's opinion effectively evaded the
rigors of the three-part test of Lemon, also authored by Burger, and
failed to put in its place a metric for evaluating government's
religious speech. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch
introduced into Establishment Clause jurisprudence the inquiry
into government endorsement of religious belief, and in Allegheny
County her approach attracted a majority. As stated by Justice
Blackmun for the Court in Allegheny County, "The Establishment
Clause... prohibits government from appearing to take a position
on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
40
community."1
There were disagreements within the majority over applications
of that test; all within it agreed that the Nativity scene on the
grand staircase of the county courthouse constituted a forbidden
endorsement of Christmas, while the group disagreed about a trio
of symbols, placed outside the city-county building, which included
a Christmas tree, a Chanukah menorah, and a peace sign.
Notwithstanding these disagreements, Allegheny County marked
the first time that the Supreme Court had ever held that the
Establishment Clause forbids a government religious message,
outside the context of public elementary and secondary schools.
Moreover, Allegheny County, by its adoption of the endorsement
139. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
140. Id. at 593-94 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring)).
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standard for government message cases, strongly signaled that
message cases would be evaluated by criteria different from money
cases, and that all government-sponsored religious messages were
open to serious Establishment Clause scrutiny.
AfterAllegheny County, the Court's decision inLee v. Weisman,14
holding unconstitutional a school sponsored prayer by an invited
clergyman at a public middle-school commencement,1 42 came as no
great surprise."' To be sure, the Court's opinion purported to focus
on the coercive aspects of prayer at public school commencements,
which the Court deemed "obligatory" events in the lives of students
and their families.' Only the concurring Justices emphasized other
approaches, including the newly minted inquiry into endorsement,
and the older, much-maligned three-part test of Lemon."'5 What
was apparent from the opinions in Lee, however, was that the
relevant law had now come to include a battery of approaches with
which to attack government religious messages.1 46
By the early 1990s, then, the law had come to reflect fully
the notion that government religious messages are of dubious
constitutionality, that all such messages are subject to serious
review, and that such messages in coercive settings-regardless of
whether active participation is compelled, as it typically is not
in the commencement context-are especially troublesome. In
short, the general understanding of the late-eighteenth century
that religious speech on behalf of the branches of government,
whether legislative, executive, or judicial, 47 constituted a
141. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
142. See id. at 583, 593-99.
143. The Rehnquist Court's earlier decision inEdwards u.Aguillard,482 U.S. 578 (1987),
invalidating a Louisiana law which required curricular treatment of "creation science in
public schools to balance the coverage given Darwinian evolution, had already signaled the
Court's continuing commitment to exclude officially sponsored religious speech in the public
schools.
144. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 598-99.
145. See id. at 602-04, 627, for the relevant portions of Justices Blackmun's and Souter's
concurring opinions, respectively.
146. The lower courts have reacted by taking quite seriously all three approaches extant
in Lee. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000); Chandler v.
James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded sub nom., Chandler v.
Siegelman, 120 S. Ct. 2714 (2000); ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d
1471 (3d Cir. 1996); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
147. Religious messages by courts still present difficulties, depending on form and context.
Compare the frieze sculpture at the U.S. Supreme Court, which contains representations of
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universally accepted part of the political culture, had been rather
dramatically undone. Because the inquiries into government
endorsement and coercion leave room for some governmentsponsored religious messages, one cannot say that the recent cases
have embraced a strict separationist view of such speech.
Nevertheless, the tendency in the direction of separation on such
issues is unmistakable.
By marked contrast, the inclination in the government money
cases over the past fifteen years has been markedly away from the
separationist approach marked by Lemon and toward a set of
doctrines that gives the government substantial room to provide
resources to religious entities engaged in projects of secular value.
Two lines of cases buttress this trend. The first, involving
government transfers to religious institutions, was inaugurated by
the Court's decision in Bowen v. Kendrick,'" which rejected an
Establishment Clause attack on the Adolescent Family Life Act.
The Act required local grant-seekers to include religious entities,
among others, in their plans for delivering services to adolescents
on matters related to teenage pregnancy and sexuality.149 Bowen
held that courts should not presume that such a program would
unconstitutionally advance religion, or result in forbidden
interaction between churches and government. 5 ' Rather, the Court
held that Establishment Clause attacks had to be focused on
particular grants, and it required proof that government moneywas
being spent to proselytize or otherwise advance a religious
mission.'
Bowen thus effectively refused to extend the framework of the
line of cases, beginning with Lemon, that had presumed that
financial assistance to sectarian institutions engaged in teaching
many famous lawgivers, religious and otherwise, with the conduct of Judge Roy Moore of
Alabama, who posted the Ten Commandments and engaged in other acts ofreligious worship
in his courtroom. See Joyce Howard Price, Judge Targeted by ACLUElected, WAsH. TIMES,
June 8, 2000, at A10 (reporting Judge Moore's victory in the Republican primary for Chief
Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court); Kevin Sack, Judge Tradeson Renown in Race, N.Y.
TImEs, June 5, 2000, at A22 (describing Judge Moore's practices of posting the Ten
Commandments in his courtroom and opening his court session with a prayer).
148. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
149. See id. at 596.
150. See id. at 612.
151. See id. at 621.
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the young was likely to result in constitutional violations. Although
Bowen held out the possibility that grants to "pervasively sectarian"
institutions might trigger the same presumptions as did aid to
"pervasively sectarian" schools, 5 2 Bowen's consequence was a
general relaxation of the strictures on financial transfers between
government and religiously controlled entities. To be sure, Bowen
did not involve primary or secondary education, but it did involve
the highly charged context of counseling teenagers on matters of
sexuality and reproduction. That such a context did not trigger a
presumption that faith-based institutions would use governmentsponsored programs to inculcate religious values was highly
significant. Indeed, Bowen laid the constitutional foundation for
this past term's breakthrough decision in Mitchell v. Helms... and
for the charitable choice movement, discussed in the final section of
this Essay. 54
If there were doubts after Bowen as to whether aid to sectarian
schools might still be treated, sui generis, under the strictseparationist standard that developed in the 1970s, they were
dispelled inAgostiniv. Felton,in which the Court overruledAguilar
v. Felton and upheld the provision of remedial educational services
by public employees on-site at sectarian schools. 5 Agostini
purported to apply the Lemon criteria, but it did so with a decidedly
and explicitly softer touch. The Agostini opinion collapsed the
"forbidden effects" and"excessive entanglement" elements ofLemon
into a single inquiry focused on the religion-promoting effects of the
program.15 6 Because public employees, not under the control of
sectarian schools, delivered the instruction in the remedial
program, the Court rejected the presumption that the program
created a significant risk of government-sponsored religious
indoctrination.'
Moreover, Agostini emphasized the religionneutral criteria by which the program allocated assistance. The
remedial instruction available under the program went to schools

152. See id. at 610.
153. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).

154. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
155. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1997).
156. See id. at 223-35.
157. See id. at 228.
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public and private, sectarian and otherwise." On a nationwide
basis, this meant Catholic schools constituted a substantial, but by
no means overwhelming, proportion of the schools in which the
program operated.
To be sure,Agostiniinvolved benefits provided in-kind and not in
cash to sectarian schools. This feature of the program made it far
easier to be certain that government resources were not flowing
directly to the school's religious mission. But that feature had not
saved the program twelve years before. In light of the overruling of
Aguilar, Agoatini must be read as a decision that weakens the
separationist principles that had once governed the provision of inkind resources to sectarian schools, even those in which
sectarianism pervades. Moreover, Agostini is of a piece with
another, earlier Rehnquist Court decision, Zobrest v. Catalina
15 9 in which the
Foothills School District,
Court held that the
Establishment Clause did not bar the provision of a publicly
employed interpreter for a hearing-impaired child attending a
sectarian school.5 0 Despite the fact that the interpreter would help
translate theology lessons and daily Mass to the student, the Court
in Zobrest was convinced by the argument that religiously
motivated parents and students deserve access to public resources
equal to that provided to their secularly motivated counterparts. 6 '
So viewed, Zobrest is but one in the second line of cases that
buttress the trend away from separationism in money mattersthose involving claims of equal access to the provision of government resources made available for a variety of purposes. This line
finds its genesis in Widmar v. Vincent,'6 2 which involved a student
group organized for religious purposes seeking access to meeting
space on a state university campus, 6 ' and extends to Board of
Education v. Mergens, 6 4 Lamb's Chapel v. CenterMoriches Union
6 5 and Rosenberger
Free School District,'
v. Rector of University of

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id. at 232.
509 U.S. 1 (1993).
See id. at 3.
See id. at 8-10.
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
See id. at 265.
496 U.S. 226 (1990).
508 U.S. 384 (1993).
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166 All of these cases have a similar structure. Each one
Virginia.
involves the government's reliance on the Establishment Clause as
a shield against claims of equal access to government resources by
religiously motivated groups, and judicial rejection of that shield in
favor of equal access claims. Moreover, they all involve associations
of religiously motivated individuals, but not corporate religious
institutions, such as churches. Equal access claims ofthis character
are of course in considerable tension with separationist
philosophies; separationism presumes that organizations with a
religious character must bear special disabilities by virtue of that
character when the government is distributing benefits. Perhaps
the principle of equal access will not be extended to religious
institutions, especially sectarian elementary and secondary
schools. 67 As the twentieth century drew to a close, these questions
remained undecided. But for any observer with a sense of history
and momentum, the law at century's end represented an inversion
of a long-standing historical trend to disfavor government financial
support to religious institutions while simultaneously tolerating
government messages supportive of religious themes.

F. Money and Speech in the 1999 Term
At the millenniunm's turn, money separationism was under siege;
message separationism was in the ascendancy. The first two
Establishment Clause decisions of the twenty-first century have
strikingly reinforced this trend. The Court's 6-3 decision on June 19
in SantaFeIndependentSchool Districtv. Doe elaborated upon and
reinforced all of the themes prominent in the government message
cases that preceded it. Its decision nine days later in Mitchell v.
166. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). The Court has granted certiorari in Good News Club v. Milford
CentralSchool, 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000), in which the Second Circuit rejected an equal

access claim by a religious group seeking to provide religious instruction in an after-hours
program, open to various instructional and social groups, for young children on public school
premises. See 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000).
167. Some courts have drawn precisely this distinction and have refused to extend the
benefit of voucher-type arrangements to sectarian schools even when private, nonsectarian
schools may participate. See, e.g., Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (lst Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 329 (1999); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 364 (1999); Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Department of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt.
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 626 (1999).
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Helms, albeit splintered into a four-Justice plurality, a two-Justice
concurrence, and a three-Justice dissent, overruled two Burger
Court precedents, broke new ground in a number of ways, and
upheld an aid program that never would have survived at the time
of either Everson or Lemon.
It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Court's opinion
in Santa Fe as confirmation and expansion of the principles of
message separationism in the public schools. SantaFe involved the
permissibility of student-led prayer at public high school football
games. After suit was filed against the practice at Santa Fe High
School of having the "student council chaplain" deliver a prayer
before home football games, the school district enacted a policy that
remitted the question of student-led prayer at commencement and
at sporting events to student elections.1 6 First, the students voted
on whether the event should be preceded by an "invocation and/or
message.., to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship
and student safety, and to establish the appropriate environment
for the competition."'6 9 If the students so voted, they then voted
again to select which student would deliver the message.'7
The only real issue was whether the student speech should be
viewed as private or whether it should be attributed to the state;
there was little doubt that the sectarian religious messages that
had been uttered immediately prior to the games for many years,
would, if spoken by agents or employees of the school, have violated
the Establishment Clause. The Court's opinion in Santa Fe,
however, showed little hesitancy in disposing
of the private-public
7
question unfavorably to the school district.' '
Relying on an elaborate history of official involvement within the
district in decisions to support prayer exercises at commencement
and other school functions, the Court trotted out every conceivable
doctrinal impediment to the school's policy. Building upon and
expanding Lee, the Court held that the prayer policy involved statesupported coercion of public school children to acquiesce in
prayer. 72 The Court gave little credence to the District's arguments
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2272-73 (2000).
Id. at 2273 n.6.
See id. at 2273.
See id. at 2275-79.
See id. at 2277.
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that no students were coerced by such a policy. Players,
cheerleaders, and band members were all required to be at the
games, and other students, the Court said, should not be put to the
choice between avoiding a religious exercise and attending an event
of importance to the school and community.'
Invoking the nowentrenched theory of endorsement, the Court held that the
District's policy endorsed prayer at football games because the text
of the policy explicitly mentioned "invocation" and "solemnization"
as among the purposes of the pregame message, and because the
trappings of a high school football game would make any prayer
over the public address system appear to an objective listener "as
stamped with [the] school's seal of approval."'7 4 Even Lemon,
thought dead in many quarters, got its due; the school's policy,
understood in local, historical context, lacked a secular purpose. 7 5
Finally, and quite significantly, the doctrine of political
entanglement, thought dead since the mid-70s, reappeared. That
doctrine had originally appeared in money cases, 7 6 and had
typically referred to the likelihood that aid policies would lead to
political strife along sectarian lines.'" This was a euphemism for
Protestant-Catholic division, and the idea that policies that invited
sectarian political fights were constitutionally suspect seemed to
have perished in the abortion funding cases.7 8 Religious groups,
like others, have rights to lobby and speak on political issues.
Nevertheless, in Santa Fe, the concern about political entanglement reappeared in a new and exceedingly persuasive context. The
Court's opinion reasoned that the elections authorized by the
district's policy "entrust[ed] the inherently nongovernmental
subject of religion to a majoritarian vote," 7 9 and therefore violated
the Constitution regardless of the outcome of the vote. An election
173. See id at 2280.
174. Id. at 2278.

175. See id. at 2278-79.
176. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973).
177. See id. at 794-98.
178. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,319-20 (1980) (concluding that abortion funding
restrictions that coincide with the religious tenets of the Roman Catholic Church do not
violate the Establishment Clause); Maherv. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,479-80 (1977) (acknowledging
the sharp division of policy and value judgments spurred by public funding for
nontherapeutic abortions, while upholding state regulation limiting that funding).
179. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2283.
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mechanism, where all understand that the choice is focused on the
possibility of prayer, "encourages divisiveness along religious
lines,"8 0 and is therefore impermissible. After Santa Fe, secular
issues with religious overtones inevitably and appropriately will
remain for resolution by the state's political processes, but issues of
religious observance in public institutions may not be so resolved.
The sweeping opinion in Santa Fe should resolve the uncertainty,
lingering in the lower courts since the decision in Lee v. Weisman
in 1992, about the acceptability of school-enacted policies which are
designed to promote student-spoken prayer at commencement or
other school-sponsored events. A number oflower courts had upheld
such policies on the theory that they involved voluntary student
speech and that the school districts enacting them had remained
sufficiently remote from the content of that speech to satisfy the
Constitution. 8 ' After Santa Fe, any system of student election, in
which school policy promotes invocation as a message or
solemnization as a purpose, is doomed. Moreover, any system of
official selection of student speakers for such events will violate the
Establishment Clause if the history and context of the selection
system reveals an official desire to have or maintain prayer at the
event. Given the usual history of such policies, enacted in the wake
of Lee precisely to avoid that decision's strictures and thereby
maintain a community custom of graduation prayer, few are likely
to survive. Indeed, school districts' best hope is that the U.S. Courts
of Appeals will stubbornly resist the teachings of Santa Fe.
Decided on the final day of the 1999 Term, just nine days after
Santa Fe, Mitchell is the more remarkable of the two, though the
absence of a majority opinion will produce some continued mystery
about its portents. Mitchell involved a federal program which was
a companion to the remedial instruction program reinstated in
Agostini; the program challenged in Mitchell, long known as
Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of
1981, distributed federal money to state and local educational
agencies, which used the money to purchase educational equipment
180. Id.
181. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070, 1076 (11th Cir. 2000); Chandler
v. James, 180 F.3d 1254,1258-60 (11th Cir. 1999), vacatedandremandedsub nom., Chandler
v. Siegelman, 120 S. Ct. 2714 (2000); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963,
968-69 (5th Cir. 1992).
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for loan to private elementary and secondary schools."8 2 The statute
limits the use of this "equipment," which includes computers,
software, library books, VCRs, films, tapes, and other audio-visual
material, to programs that are 'secular, neutral, and nonideological.""8 The program included restrictions on diversion of
the loaned equipment to religious use, although these restrictions
were not carefully enforced by public authorities.8 4
The litigation in Mitchell involved a challenge to the program as
applied in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, in which Catholic schools
were among the beneficiaries. The district judge had found a small
amount of evidence of religious use of the material over a fifteenyear period."s The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, although
recognizing that Meek v. Pittengerand Wolman v. Walter had been
put in doubt by subsequent decisions,' nevertheless relied in part
on those two cases to hold that the Establishment Clause8precluded
7
the loan of instructional materials to sectarian schools.
After holding the case under advisement for almost seven
months-suggesting a long, arduous and ultimately unsuccessful
struggle to keep a majority united behind a single opinion-the
Supreme Court reversed. A plurality opinion, authored by Justice
Thomas and joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and
Justice Scalia, offered a bold and stunning repudiation of much of
the prior law on the subject of aid to sectarian schools. The plurality
opinion insisted on two criteria: the aid program must be neutral as
between sectarian schools and others, 1" both private and public,
and the government itself must not be engaged in religious
indoctrination." 9 By these criteria, the Chapter 2 program easily
passed muster. The aid went to a broad array of schools. Moreover,
because the aid formula turned on per capita allocation, the
182. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530,2536-38 (2000).
183. Id at 2537.
184. See ici at 2554 n.15.
185. See id at 2553-55.
186. See Helmsv. Picard, 151 F.3d347, 369 (5thCir. 1998) (citingWalkerv. San Francisco
Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449,1464-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229,237 (1997); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,362-63 (1975); Board ofEduc. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 248 (1968))), rev'd sub nom. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
187. See Helms, 151 F.3d at 369-74.
188. See Mitchell, 120 S.Ct. at 2552.
189. See id. at 2552-53.
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plurality found the program neutral in still another way-the
amount of aid a school received was in proportion to the number of
students it attracted, and the program therefore created no
incentives to choose sectarian education. 90 Finally, the plurality
rejected the argument that the possibility of diversion of the aid to
religious instruction created an Establishment Clause obstacle; any
such diversion, though it might violate the governing statute or
regulations, would not be attributable to the government and
therefore would not violate the Establishment Clause. 1 Along the
way, the plurality overruled Meek and Wolman, 92 as indeed its logic
required, and squarely rejected the notion that aid to "pervasively
sectarian" schools should be treated under rules any different from
aid to other schools. 9 ' Labeling such a distinction offensive,
troubling, and anti-Catholic in its "pedigree," the plurality
concluded that a doctrine "requir[ing] the exclusion of pervasively
sectarian schools from otherwise permissible194aid programs... [is]
born of bigotry [and] should be buried now."
The concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor and Breyer parted
company from the plurality on a number of points, 195 and for the
moment it is the concurrence that holds the balance of power on
issues of money separationism1 98 The concurrence described the
plurality as having "announce[d] a rule of unprecedented breadth
for the evaluation of Establishment Clause challenges to government school-aid programs."' 9 In particular, and quite accurately,
the concurrence concluded that the plurality's onlylimiting criteria,
coverage neutrality and government responsibility for religious
indoctrination, would impede very little, if any, aid. Government
could pay for school buildings, or salaries of teachers in secular
subjects, so long as the beneficiary class was broad enough to
satisfy neutrality constraints.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 2547-49.
192. See id. at 2540.
193. See id. at 2550-52.
194. Id. at 2552.
195. See id. at 2556-72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. The lengthy dissent by Justice Souter, see id. at 2572-97, joined by Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg, adheres to the traditional, Burger Court view of church-state separation in
aid matters.
197. Id. at 2556.
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The concurring opinion, expressing far more caution than the
plurality, refused to make neutrality and nonindoctrination by
government themselves dispositive 9 8 Nor was the concurrence
willing to treat as equivalents, in the evaluation of neutrality, a
direct grant to schools allocated by students per capita, and a
program of benefits distributed to families in which intervening
private choice arguably breaks the aid connection between the state
and the sectarian school.1 99 In particular, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence reasoned that a per capita school aid program may
create a public perception of government endorsement of religious
education that a "true" family choice program would not.2 00
Moreover, the concurrence was especially troubled at the prospect,
neither embraced nor condemned by the plurality, of grants in cash
instead of kind to sectarian schools. 20 ,
Nevertheless, the concurrence noted the tension between the
1968 opinion inAllen, approving textbook loans involving sectarian
schools, and the mid-1970s decisions invalidating the loan of other
materials.20 2 It resolved that tension in the same way as the
plurality, overruling Meek and Wolman, °3 thereby permitting the
provision of instructional materials to sectarian schools if the
Constitution is otherwise satisfied.
In sustaining Chapter 2, the concurrence pushed significantly
beyond the prior law. Agostini, the 1997 decision that reinstated
the remedial instruction program, had rested in large part on the
fact of public employees as instructors. Under Chapter 2, that
feature was absent; sectarian school administrators and teachers
were entrusted with the computers, software, books, and media
materials under general instructions that they be used only for
secular and nonideological purposes. In the constitutional world of
the mid-70s, that entrustment would have been fatal. But the
concurrence read Agostini for the "proposition that . . . presumptions [that sectarian school teachers always and everywhere
engage in] religious indoctrination are normally inappropriate when
198.
199.
200.
201.

See id at 2556-58.
See id. at 2559.
See i,&
See id. at 2559-60.

202. See id. at 2564.
203. See id. at 2567.
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evaluating neutral school-aid programs under the Establishment
Clause." 2 4 From now on, according to the concurrence, "[tlo
establish a First Amendment violation, plaintiffs must prove that
the aid in question actually is, or has been, used for religious
purposes."20 5 Moreover, without joining in the plurality's explicit
condemnation of the concept of pervasive sectarianism as the
product of anti-Catholic bigotry, the concurrence joined in
essentially undoing the presumption attached to that concept. On
the record in Mitchell, the concurrence concluded that the
safeguards against religious uses of publicly financed materials
were sufficient, and the evidence of violation of the safeguards was
so sparse and distant in time as to be safely ignored.0 6
Mitchellwithout question leaves important questions unresolved.
The concurring opinion was careful to say nothing to tip its authors'
hands on the question of vouchers. Will they be viewed as neutral
devices, covering sectarian and nonsectarian schools, and running
through families so as to disconnect government from responsibility
for how voucher funds are spent by recipient schools? Or will the
perception that they involve direct transfer to sectarian schools,
coupled with the very large frequency of sectarian schools on the
list of eligible schools, doom voucher programs to a finding of
unconstitutional endorsement or nonneutrality?2 7 Stay tuned.
Would a federal program designed to wire all schools in America to
the Internet survive constitutional challenge, or might the
concurring Justices conclude that religious and secular uses will be
so hopelessly inseparable in sectarian schools as to cast doubt on
such a system? If we take Justices Breyer and O'Connor at their
word, proof of religious use is required to invalidate an aid program
as applied, and surely, evidence of occasional religion-oriented trips
into cyberspace will not suffice; I would expect that only evidence
of systematic, school-inspired, theologically sectarian journeys of
this kind will be sufficient to cast constitutional doubt on particular
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 2569-71.
207. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed an order enjoining
the operation of Cleveland's voucher program on the ground that the financing formula
produced a heavy tilt in the direction of sectarian schools as voucher program participants.
See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, Nos. 00-3055/00-3060/00-3063, 2000 U.S. App. LEXS 31367,
at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2000), afg 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
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applications of such a system. Moreover, recall that the O'ConnorBreyer alliance is a new one, that there is no reason to think that
the two will agree on all questions in the future, and that the
plurality only needs one of them for the results its members prefer.
Justice O'Connor has shown before that in the really close cases she
will lean with the anti-separationists. °5
Head-counting aside, Mitchell unquestionably broke new ground
on crucial issues of money separationism. It overruled prior law,
repudiated crucial aid-blocking concepts, and reversed the presumption that sectarian schools cannot be trusted to use public aid
for nonsectarian purposes. The public-private school battles will
rage on over many issues. But for the first time in thirty years,
those who assert constitutional grounds of opposition to aid to
sectarian schools find themselves on the defensive.
When Elian flew off to Cuba, and the Justices were able to
retreat to their summer vacations, what had become plain was that
separationism in government money cases had been considerably
weakened, and separationism in government speech cases had
gained considerable strength. True enough, there are only three
Justices-Kennedy, O'Connor, and Breyer-of the nine currently
sitting who have shown a willingness to be strong separationists on
money or speech, but not both. The other six Justices represent two
camps of three full separationists and three anti-separationists,
respectively. Nevertheless, given the basic coherence and appeal of
the money-speech distinction, such splinterings are likely to be far
more transitory than the law they produce.
IV. THE ARc's CuTTING EDGE
The changes in America described in the early sections of this
Essay account persuasively for the tendencies in the law described
in Part HI. The Establishment Clause was designed originally for
two purposes: 1) to keep the federal government out of religious
affairs, and thereby to preserve religious liberty against the threats
208. InLynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), for example, Justice O'Connor complained
about the absence of standards by which to measure the validity of religious speech by
government and crafted her own "endorsement" standard which purported to be more
restrictive than the Court's approach. Nevertheless, she provided the deciding vote to uphold
a publicly financed display of a Christmas crtche. See iaL at 687.
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that religious establishment would represent; and 2) to limit the
danger of factional religious strife over political matters. At the
time of the Founding, the main source of such threats and such
strife came from struggles between competing Protestant sects.
Whether or not the bitterest fights are always between those of the
same faith, generic Anglo-Saxon Protestantism was social glue in
the late-eighteenth century only so long as government did not take
sides within the genre. Accordingly, while government money might
effectively favor some religious causes over others, depending on the
terms and purposes of the expenditures, pro-Christian government
speech did not stir up social conflict.
In the mid-twentieth century, when Everson began the Court's
serious nonestablishment work, the major factional divide in
American religious life was that between Catholics and Protestants.
The Court tried to remove that struggle from politics, first by
circumscribing the possibility of effective political appeals for state
financing of Catholic schools, and, later, by removing religious
exercises from the common schools.
Now, with religious pluralism and doctrines of equality at the
center of the American ethos, and with the government more and
more in the business of administering to persons in ways formerly
undertaken by religious communities, nonestablishment concerns
have shifted considerably. Government assistance to programs of
secular value, operated by religious entities, benefits a broad array
of faith groups, Christian and otherwise. And such schemes can and
are organized around criteria neutral between religion and
nonreligion, and among religions themselves. Although in the short
run such programs surely will benefit disproportionately those
faiths with existing institutional structures poised to take
advantage of the opportunities created by a new political and
judicial climate, in the long run a regime of equal access,
nondiscrimination, and formal neutrality in the distribution of
government resources may reduce tension in the culture wars and
enhance the social legitimacy of all groups, faith-based or otherwise, that help administer the commonwealth.
By contrast, government-sponsored religious messages can never
achieve the status of neutrality among religions. Some faiths will
be heavily represented in political councils and influence; others
will seem deviant and strange. While the latter may qualify for
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some sort of government program as one of many, it is hard to see
how they will get equal attention from government when supportive
messages are launched. So the Christmas season is likely to get
government support and attention in ways that Ramadan will not;
Easter will trump Passover as the springtime holiday that political
arms of the government must acknowledge, and so on. 20 9 Having
absorbed groups other than Protestant Christians into the mainstream of American society, we can no longer have government
treat these faiths with toleration but something less than equal
respect, encouragement, and support. Moreover, because government cannot possibly be evenhanded in its distribution of respect,
endorsement, and support,2 1 ° the only sensible constitutional
solution for the twenty-first century is some form of separationist
principle designed to keep government from taking positions on
matters of religious faith, celebration, and observance.
All of this is not to say that our ultimate constitutional
destination will be complete separation on speech matters and a
complete breakdown of separation concerns on money matters.
With respect to speech matters, the current trends in the Supreme
Court are designed to emphatically reinforce the prohibition on
official sponsorship of religious messages in the public schools.
Questions will remain as to the extent to which schools will be held
responsible for the religious speech of their students at school
functions, but the Santa Fe opinion surely suggests that the Court
will not give the benefit of the doubt to school districts engaged in
some form of questionable quasi-sponsoring of religious exercise.
The trends seem equally likely, however, to result in preservation, not condemnation, of significant aspects of the "civil
religion," by which government and its officials acknowledge a
religious force in the society. The motto of "In God We Trust" will
remain on the coins and currency, Presidents will continue to issue
Thanksgiving Day proclamations that reference God, and Congress
209. Cases involving challenges to decisions by public schools or public employers about
which religious holidays are appropriate for institutional closure are at the cutting edge of
this problem. See, e.g., Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding, against
Establishment Clause challenge, a Maryland law creating statewide public school holidays
on the Friday before Easter and the Monday after Easter), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 938 (2000).
210. For example, it is difficult to imagine an elected official leading the cheers for the
Branch Dividians or the Worldwide Church of God.
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'will keep its chaplains,2 1 ' its resolutions of National Prayer Day,
and the like. The civil religion, however, will inevitably become
more abstract, more generically theist, and not necessarily more
monotheist at that. State-sponsored postings of the Ten
Commandments,21 2 once the sort of thing it would have been
unthinkable to challenge on political or legal grounds, will be
perceived as Judeo-Christian, and therefore sectarian, and
therefore constitutionally inappropriate.
With respect to money matters, Mitchell has erased some prior
impediments to in-kind aid to sectarian institutions, eliminated
the presumption that such aid in the hands of such institutions
will inevitably and impermissibly advance religion, effectively
obliterated the advancement-entanglement tension associated with
the regime of Lemon, buried the category of "pervasively sectarian"
schools, and reformulated the ground upon which programs of aid
that include sectarian institutions will now be fought. Whatever
else Mitchell may portend for systems of transfer from government
for the benefit of sectarian schools, large questions remain
unresolved. Chief among these on the current agenda are the
constitutionality of school voucher plans that include sectarian
schools among their potential beneficiaries, and the validity of a
wide variety of charitable choice programs, either enacted 21 3 or

211. The ugly fight in the U.S. House of Representatives over the appointment ofthe first
Catholic chaplain does suggest, however, that Establishment Clause concerns about religious
factions and government do indeed bear upon such appointments. See, e.g., Catalina Camia,
New House ChaplainSays He's a PointofPridefor Catholics,THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 15, 2000, at G1, available in LEXIS, News Library, The Dallas Morning News File
(reporting that the Republicans initially backed a Protestant chaplain, which sparked
protests and bitter charges of religious bias); Juliet Eilperin, Conflict FlaresAgain over
House Chaplain,WASH. POST, Apr. 12,2000, atA25 (quoting Rep. Roemer, D-Ind., as saying,
"this is a very overt politicization of the chaplaincy itself, and this shouldn't be part of a
political process"). As religious diversity in America as a whole, and within many states,
increases, such struggles about the appointment of chaplains are likely to increase.
212. See, e.g., Rosin & Claiborne, supra note 12, at A3 (describing legislation in Indiana
and elsewhere permitting public schools and other public buildings to post copies of the Ten
Commandments).
213. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2161 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (Supp. 1997)),
contains a provision requiring states to consider religious organizations as possible
contracting partners if the state chooses to engage in contracting for social services under
the Act with private, nonprofit organizations. See id. § 604(a)(1)(A).
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proposed.2 1 4 Both major party candidates for the Presidency in 2000
expressed support for the concept of charitable choice,2 15 and its
accompanying delivery of government services by faith-based
organizations, so the political center of gravity is quite favorably
located for the future of such programs. School voucher plans
and charitable choice plans (the former are but a subcategory of
the latter, although the Democrats are reluctant to acknowledge
that) both include religious entities as permissible distributors of
government largesse and do not require a dilution of the religious
identity of qualifying religious institutions as a condition of
participation. The voucher plans raise very difficult questions, such
as the extent to which government benefits in cash rather than inkind may pass through the hands of parents to sectarian schools
under circumstances in which government officials can clearly and
completely foresee the religious tilt among participating institutions, and the extent to which a strong tilt in favor of a small
number of faiths in the distribution of participating schools 21may
6
undermine the religious neutrality of voucher arrangements.
Moreover, even if the basic transfer arrangements in such
programs are constitutionally acceptable, the voucher and
charitable choice arrangements alike will raise questions of the
extent to which such programs may, or must, include restrictions
on participating institutions to temper their commitment or zeal.
For example, may or must government require that such
institutions refrain from engaging in religious communication with

214. Both the Senate and the House have considered other charitable choice provisions,
but none have yet become law. See, e.g., The Fathers Count Act of 1999, H.R. 3073, 105th
Cong. (1999) (permitting charitable choice in program to promote responsible fatherhood);
Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, S. 254,
106th Cong. (1999) (permitting charitable choice in social services related to juvenile justice);
Youth Drug and Mental Health Services Act, S. 976, 106th Cong (1999) (permitting
charitable choice in substance abuse and mental health treatment); Consequences for
Juvenile Offenders Act of 1999, H.R. 1501,106th Cong. (1999) (permitting charitable choice
in juvenile justice services); The Charitable Choice Expansion Act of 1998, S. 2046, 105th
Cong. (1998) (providing an umbrella provision that requires consideration of faith-based
providers in all programs in which the state relies on private organizations to deliver social
services using federal funds).
215. See supranotes 14-15 and accompanying text.
216. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, Nos. 00-3055/00-3060/00-3063,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
31367, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2000) (invalidating Cleveland voucher program on the ground
that it favors sectarian schools).
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voucher students, or charitable choice clients, who would prefer to
avoid such a message? Such regulation will help insure that
government benefits are not being used to proselytize unwilling
listeners, but will simultaneously constrain the expression of
religious identity by participating institutions.
In a related vein, may or must government require that such
institutions not discriminate on the basis of religion in selecting
students or clients, or in hiring those who will teach them or
otherwise minister to their needs? Such requirements of nondiscrimination would similarly constrain religious institutions, but
would protect equal access of potential employees and recipients to
government-financed programs. Furthermore, the absence of a
religious nondiscrimination requirement in hiring might be seen as
double-dipping by religious institutions, which rely on their
sectarian character in their quest for autonomy in selecting
employees while simultaneously seeking a place as a religionneutral dispenser of government benefits. Constitutional doctrines
requiring any such limitations on the autonomy of religious entities,
or permitting legislatures to impose them if so inclined, will surely
dilute the appeal of such programs to many faith-based institutions.
Of course, with a set of doctrines that bends away from
separationism in money matters and toward separationism on
message matters, it will be crucial to know which is which.
Advocates will have obvious doctrinal incentives to characterize
government programs as money or speech in order to get the benefit
of the rules more favorable to the outcome preferred. For example,
charitable choice opponents will argue that the private religious
speech of participating religious institutions should be attributed
to the government, rendering the programs a form of unconstitutional endorsement of religion by the state. 17
217. Perhaps with the arc of Establishment Clause developments in mind, Dean Kathleen
Sullivan has argued that sectarian schools, because they are accredited by the state and
responding to state-created compulsion for children to attend school, should be taken by
courts as engaging in government speech because such schools are advancing a governmentmandated message. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades,Public Squares, and Voucher
Payments: Problemsof Government Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. REV.243 (1996). This argument
seems to me to be an attempt by an opponent of government assistance to sectarian
education to treat what has long been seen as a matter of government money as instead a
matter of government speech, where the chance of a successful Establishment Clause
challenge has now been considerably enhanced. IfDean Sullivan is right, then accreditation
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The decision inPinette,218 in which the Court refused to attribute
to government an episode of private religious speech in a public
forum, suggests that the attempt to convert government resources,
made available in a religion-neutral way, into the equivalent of
government speech in favor of religion is doomed to fail. That
government may limit speech by government grantees 219 does not
convert all speech by such grantees into government speech unless
the government has required it as a grant condition.
To put the point more simply, the change in trajectory of the
government money cases will not be easily or lightly undone.
Indeed, one can hope that the expansion of participation by
religious institutions in public programs, permitted by the change
in standards in government money cases, will in the short run
produce salutary consequences. In the broadest sense, these might
go beyond efficient delivery of government benefits to include a
broadly enriching peace and cooperation among diverse social
traditions, faith-based and otherwise.
Because perfect religious equality, pluralism, and toleration seem
inconsistent with the drive to know "Ultimate Truth" that lies at
the heart of many faiths,220 it is hard to believe that such a peace
can attain a stable equilibrium. Nevertheless, such a hope remains
a part of constitutional faith, expressed through the gloss on the
Religion Clauses, as it rewinds itself around circumstances far
removed from those at the Founding. Whether the move away
from money separationism and toward message separationism
represents a profound nonoriginalism, or an ultimate form of
of sectarian schools, with or without government funds in support, is a constitutionally
dubious venture, because accreditation alone would make the government an endorser of the
school's religious message to the extent it is intertwined with required secular subjects. On
this line of thinking, not likely to prevail in the near future, Pierce v. Society ofSisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), must be entirely rethought.
218. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (holding that
state does not violate Establishment Clause by permitting privately sponsored display of a
Latin cross in a public forum).
219. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (holding that government does not
violate the First Amendment by restricting abortion counsels or referrals by governmentfinanced family planning agencies).
220. This side of religious experience and its implications for constitutionalism has been
explored elsewhere. See William P. Marshall, Religion As Ideas: Religion As Identity, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGALIssuES 385,388-91,397-99 (1996); William P. Marshall, The OtherSide of
Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (1993).
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originalism in its overarching and consistent concern with civil
peace as the primary end of nonestablishment, I leave to others to
decide.

